Good Afternoon,
The UK wasn’t the only place with fireworks this with week.
What with the Non-Farm Payrolls (NFP 271,000) increasing the probability of a
rate rise – now the odds are looking at 85/15 in favour.
The NFP fanfare has forced investors to consider the risks
of heavily leveraged companies and those made vulnerable by the liquidity contraction
across emerging markets and/or commodities space.
In the longer-term there may be some reward by investing in restructuring
plays like Freeport-McMoRan, but not for the faint hearted. The recovery in leveraged
companies isn’t clear cut either, so expect some reality/stresses in the
short-term.
Commodities producers reacted this week (selling) –
- China’s
focus on innovation and a limited response to an infrastructure stimulus.
(Hopes of higher PE - long the SHCOMP on hopes and/or China 300 only on
momentum).
- Standard
Chartered’s (STAN) prudence sticking the knife into the commodity sector
and a realisation of avoiding a light in a tunnel or two (Qingdao). We
hope for STAN’s sake it’s not a train coming towards them - Currently no
reason to hold the stock.
- Fears
being realised of a credit bubble/liquidity contracting in emerging
markets.
- German
Manufacturing Data (negative for copper) – answers on a post card.
& Friday’s…
- Boom busting NFP figure that was a wildcard and above expectations.
Companies will need to bolster their balances sheets if they
operate in a deflationary market, especially those with significant debt and limited
operational free cash flow. Remind you of anyone? Not just Anglo, but the market
will now belatedly start focusing on rightful candidates. We had the analogy in
the morning call that “certain traders are
like a bunch of hyenas!!” As if!
The open secret of “debt to revenue service costs” is finally
acknowledged as a risk. Not that the writing hasn’t been on the wall for some
time. Admittedly, It’s difficult to find a reason to hold US equities with the
dollar strengthening. Those goliaths are going to take a haircut to earnings.
With fears of larger scale corporate default and financial
bubbles, the market is now factoring in restructurings whether it be
fundraising, equity issues, convertible notes or debt for equity a k a dilution
for the weak.
Shareholders should be prudent to the possibilities of
losing control via the back door or worse, there being limited equity left for
shareholders. Freeport-McMoRan (FCX) are not immune to these woes either, but
with Icahn on board at least there’s some form of hope signal for the
shareholders.
Valeant - without repeating the woes of Valeant (VRX)
verbatim (See Citron Research) – it is the pharmaceutical equivalent of VW as
it has so many unquantifiable liabilities. With three + warnings out now, it’s
likely a case of the die-hards hugging the stock. "Value seekers"
will no doubt be sifting the wreckage and be tempted to trade.
From a psychological model, with such a nuclear fallout and
one suspects more to come, is there any reason to hold Valeant? What is the
value? What are the risks? With the market perversely needing to be told of the
value or limit the slow motion car wreck, what is the likely outcome? With such
a wide range of variables, what pricing methodology does one use for Valeant?
The price range here up until Thursday was $56-$103 and now, we suspect there’s
more potential liabilities, so have narrowed this to $38-$44 a share.
The damage within the pharmacy/dispensary industry cannot be
ignored. Pharmacists may now follow the cost conscious route across all
prescriptions, not just related to Valeant medications.
In coming to a price, we’ve considered Valeant’s responses
and what we assume Pershing Square may be ignoring. Of course Pershing may be
selling/have sold, but in the absence of a notification, we’ll assume they’re
holding.
For consideration:
1.
Was Philidor using pharmacy codes for pharmacies
it had not (yet) acquired e.g. R&O?
a. Did they have permission to use them?
b. What are the implications for Valeant if they
are considered to a shadow director/owner of Philidor? Do the rights that Valeant
acquired in Philidor mean they have also liabilities?
2. Its been suggested that dermatology products
sold through Philidor were of average profitability - if we assume that at least some revenues
comprised of generics costing $5 or less, but when combined by Valeant and
branded it enabled a charge of $400 plus++. If this is correct, then it becomes
very difficult to buy into the average profitability claims suggested as the ‘worst case downside.’
3. It’s been inferred that Philidor filled/dispensed
prescriptions even when they were not required / requested. If Valeant’s
revenues were reliant on the revenues of 3 units when only one was needed - what
are the real implications on Philidor closing/departing company? Repeat prescription
business will in essence be torched?
4.
There’s been vague disclosures as to what other
'specialty pharmacy' networks Valeant has. Will this have further implications?
In making a few assumptions from the above, it’s easy to
come to conclusion that the impact on Valeant profits is likely to be double
digit. As a reminder, Valeant in October 2015 disclosed they had $1,420M cash
and debt of $30,883.3M. What will earnings be and the outlook? If one
conducted a simple calculation, deducting net debt from the market
capitalisation, what equity would left for shareholders?
In the small caps it would appear there's a sense of déjà
vu. Those that remember the views expressed here EMC:
International Mining & Infrastructure Corporation (IMIC). To quote
yours truly:
International
Mining & Infrastructure Corporation plc (IMIC) loan conversion shows
the faith in the company, a mere 30% discount to the SP. One hopes you've sense
my irony with the mere...the 1 year chart must surely look like the cellar
steps! Next stop 10 pence?
It would be wise to think how
the terms are fair and reasonable as Strand Hanson Limited, the Company's
Nominated Adviser (NOMAD), consider that the terms of this transaction are fair
and reasonable insofar as the shareholders of IMIC are concerned. Its not
something I shall be complaining about having rated this as a sell since they
acquired Afferro Mining Inc.
IMIC was suspended after the resignation
of their NOMAD Strand Hanson in October. As a positive those
holding the Afferro Mining Inc. bonds of yesteryear get a few more shares
(whether they’re tradable is another issue), with the conversion
notice yesterday. Is IMIC now extinct? Or can they pull off the
unthinkable in the current mining space? Perhaps even find a NOMAD?
So whether it’s goodbye or see you in another form? Who
knows…It’s wise to keep an eye on the assets of the micro craps, perhaps not
the companies that trade them left and right, but follow the assets.
In other news, the South African and Australian “anti-EMC fan club appears to have gone
silent!” Surely it’s not the Zumba Iron Ore share price? Atlas or perhaps
Slater & Gordon?
The final thoughts go to Anglo American (AAL) having a rights issue?? The odds are getting higher! BHP Billiton (BLT) tailings damn could be a significant liability...what are the implications and costs? We have varying ranges and estimates as high as $2B excluding losts dividends and as low as $450M,
Atb Fraser
It's too early to tell the extend of the liability will be for BHP Billiton and Vale as a result of the tailings dam failure at Samarco. With lawyers and media suggesting 'even if Samarco can't foot the bill then BLT/Vale will become responsible.'
ReplyDeleteInteresting considerations where the clean up bill is likely to be an unquantifiable for some time to come. Will BLT make provisions? Vale? What is the impact on Vale, whose debt is not to be sniffed at either (large). Over to the bond/debt traders - where there's suggestions it may be cheaper to let the company go to the wall, although the Government is giving a clear indication it "may go after the shareholders." We read this as Vale/BLT clean up your own mess.
One also thinks there's some concern with regard to the insurance...more on this later.
Atb Fraser